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"The KGB is everywhere, in everything, and that itself frustrates democracy."
Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin(1)
"We have had as much democratization as we can stomach."
KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov(2)
In trying to construct a "law-governed state" that would preserve the supremacy of the 
center, Gorbachev laid down the legal framework for his own overthrow. His decrees 
flouting the democratic process and his refusal to promote parliamentary oversight of 
the internal security organs and the military permitted those forces to engineer his 
ouster.
Ultimately, the botched August 19 coup unwittingly may have unleashed an accelerated 
process of reform that could dramatically reduce the powers of the security apparatus. 
But even if he does manage to purge the KGB, Interior Ministry, and the military, 
Gorbachev deserves none of the credit, for prior to being the victim he was an active co-
conspirator.
Following the 28th Party Congress in July 1990 at which KGB Chairman Vladimir 
Kryuchkov made a militant speech in favor of communist orthodoxy, Gorbachev 
conspicuously acquiesced time and again to the state security and other repressive 
organs.
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As Gorbachev's reformist advisors fell away, they were replaced by officials reportedly 
working for or dependent on the KGB. Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin, a former leading KGB 
counterintelligence officer, publicly warned at the time of the Party Congress that the 
Presidential Council included "KGB people, not identified as such but KGB all the same, 
not KGB officers but people who have cooperated with the KGB and are dependent on 
the KGB." He added, "Gorbachev may not know who they are . . . he probably does 
not."(3) Thus KGB men replaced reformers in Gorbachev's inner circle.
By the time he fired his moderate Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin on December 3, it was 
clear that Gorbachev had been co-opted by the security apparatus. Thereafter, 
Gorbachev meekly followed the lead of the security troika of KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, 
new Interior Minister Boris Pugo, and Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov. Kryuchkov made 
an unscheduled live television appearance on December 11, pledging—in the name of 
the president—to smash the "anti-communist tide" sweeping the Soviet Union.(4) 
Gorbachev made no attempt to disassociate himself from Kryuchkov's remarks. Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's dramatic resignation speech, in which he warned of 
impending dictatorship, should have prepared the world for what was to follow. 
Gorbachev embarked on a course of almost slavish obedience to the security troika's 
every whim.
When army, MVD and KGB forces cracked down against the democratic governments 
of Lithuania and Latvia in mid-January 1991, Gorbachev was nowhere to be reached 
and later protested that he was not responsible for the bloody acts of repression there. 
The state terror against independence-minded republics continued.
KGB's old ways made 'legal'
Gorbachev helped put in place the machinery that was employed to overthrow him in 
August. Consistent with his drive to turn the USSR into a "law-governed state," the 
Soviet government moved in 1990 to legalize the KGB's functions. However, the 
process was then directed by the KGB with the president's approval. The state security 
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apparatus itself drew up the "Draft Law on State Security Organs" for parliament to 
enact. Though ready for submission to the Congress of People's Deputies on December 
3, it was not actually presented until February 28, 1991. This lag coincided with 
Gorbachev's removal of reformist MVD chief Bakatin and the subsequent decrees which 
led to the crackdowns in the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia and elsewhere.
Law rammed through parliament
According to Moscow News, the law was rammed through the Congress without 
committee review, leaving lawmakers little chance to study or debate the document. 
Many deputies expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the law was 
presented and voted upon. Moscow News commented, "the legislators who voted 'for' 
did not fully understand the nature of the vote since the draft circulated among them, as 
announced in the conference hall, did not contain the latest changes and addenda, i.e., 
it was simply incomplete."
Reformist deputies were dismayed to learn that unknown to them when they voted, the 
law contained a series of secret amendments granting the KGB extraordinary powers. 
The amendments had been ruled unconstitutional by the USSR Constitutional Oversight 
Committee the previous November, even before the draft law was completely written.
The law, which Gorbachev supported, permits the KGB to continue operating as it had 
in the days before glasnost'. With constitutional rule restored August 21 upon the quick 
collapse of the junta, this law nevertheless remains in force, constituting a major 
obstacle to true democratic reform. The law leaves the KGB structure intact. It grants 
state security secret powers through 1992, total control over files, continued widespread 
use of secret informants without allowing the accused to face his accuser, warrantless 
searches, and warrantless telephone taps and mail interception. It makes no provision 
for effective parliamentary oversight.(5)
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Little glasnost' in security forces
At least until the collapse of the junta, the KGB, MVD and the military remained 
impervious to glasnost'. Although the KGB in recent years has been more accessible 
and outspoken than ever, the organization remained closed to scrutiny for past abuses. 
As it drew up laws, authored presidential decrees, and surrounded Gorbachev with co-
optees, the KGB (and more recently the MVD) opened public relations centers in 
Moscow and in the capitals of the union republics, held news conferences, participated 
in seminars, and provided information to journalists.
The 1991 Law on State Security Organs, in Article 14, Point 16, ensures that glasnost' 
will not be imposed on the KGB by the president or the parliament; the law grants the 
KGB complete authority to control all files concerning state security. Several reports 
indicate that the KGB at the republic and union levels has been destroying files, 
including data concerning the repression of dissidents.(6)
Despite the repeal of Article 6 of the constitution which had guaranteed the party's 
monopoly on power, the KGB has ensured communist orthodoxy within its ranks. 
Kryuchkov stated in late 1989, "Virtually all our employees are members of the 
Communist Party or the Komsomol. The secret services always were, are, and will be 
political organs."(7) He affirmed in early 1991 that the KGB cadres remained free of 
non-communist party activism.(8)
Party loyalty remained an obligation of rank-and-file KGB personnel throughout 
Gorbachev's administration. Only time will tell how soon the situation will change. One 
former counterintelligence officer, in a remarkable Soviet television interview six weeks 
before Gorbachev was overthrown, termed the KGB "an armed detachment of the 
party." On the same program, a distinguished former foreign intelligence officer who had 
been rezident(head of Soviet espionage) in Denmark, criticized the KGB as "an 
instrument in the hands of right-wingers in the Communist Party."(9)
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The KGB's public relations offices worked hard to convey the impression that it had 
become a professional, non-political force, highlighting the abolition of the feared Fifth 
Department which combatted "ideological diversion." Yet domestic critics and a few 
western Sovietologists maintained that the Fifth Department was not abolished after all, 
but had simply been renamed the Administration for the Protection of Constitutional 
Order to fit the "law-governed state" theme.(10) Kryuchkov came close to affirming this 
view. A month after announcing that the Fifth Department was abolished, he implied that 
it remained in full force when he gave the televised speech pledging the smash the 
"anti-communist tide."
Disillusionment grew throughout the ranks
Anticommunism is widespread even in KGB ranks. Disillusionment with the party has 
been expressed in the open. In 1990 and 1991 the Soviet press reported several 
instances of disciplinary action against loyal KGB officers who publicly criticized or 
resigned from the party. Superiors in at least two cases ruled that any officer who quit 
the party had to leave the KGB as well.
Discontent is not restricted to young personnel, although junior active-duty officers have 
been more outspoken than their superiors, as in Sverdlovsk, where over sixty officers 
publicly criticized the KGB's subservience to the party rather than to the parliament. 
Several colonels and generals have resigned in protest of the KGB's politicization. Maj. 
Gen. Kalugin, the highest-ranking and best known of these officers, said that disgust 
and frustration with the party festered inside him for two decades before he quit. In an 
interview with an American journalist, Kalugin admitted that he "started to question 
things in the late 1960s," and that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia being a "critical" 
turning point. He finally decided to make his break "four or five years" before resigning 
in 1990.(11)
Kalugin's reasoning is similar to that of many of his colleagues who defected to the 
West in earlier years. However, like his contemporaries in the age of glasnost', Kalugin 
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supported a strong KGB but found it unconscionable to serve as a tool of what they saw 
as a politically and morally corrupt system. "There I was," he recalled, "charged with 
hunting down dissidents and ferreting out possible defectors and spreading the cause of 
communism, and I was more and more harboring some of the same doubts, the same 
thoughts as those we were imprisoning."
It is difficult to believe, especially after the grotesquely unprofessional conduct of KGB, 
MVD and military leaders in siding with hard-core communist apparatchiki against 
Gorbachev, that lingering discontent in the security forces has eased since the coup. 
Kryuchkov, Pugo, Yazov and those who obeyed them brought disgrace and ridicule to 
their already troubled services. Cracks within the security apparatus will likely expand 
and deepen in the course of the expected post-coup purges of its personnel.
Denial of power to parliament aided coup plotters
One of Gorbachev's almost-fatal errors was to resist democratic efforts to bring the 
security forces under the control of parliament. Instead, he sought to project the image 
that the KGB, MVD and military were overseen by elected officials, while allowing these 
bodies to proceed almost as they pleased.
Elements in parliament sought, but failed to achieve, oversight of the instruments of 
force. A Defense and National Security Committee of the Supreme Soviet set up as an 
oversight body was not even able to obtain information about the non-secret KGB 
Border Guards. Deputies were similarly frustrated in trying to glean basic data from the 
military.
Indeed, the security forces proved that they were not subordinate to the parliament on 
August 19, when they staged the coup against Gorbachev and declared a state of 
emergency which attempted to suspend all elected assemblies.
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At the same time, however, profound splits in all levels of the armed services—even in 
elite units—revealed substantial sympathy for elected leaders like Yeltsin and for 
parliament. Breakdowns of discipline in the KGB, militsia, and military led to overt 
defections to Yeltsin and open defiance of the KGB, MVD and Defense chiefs on the 
junta. Troop commanders declared that, even though they had followed orders and 
mobilized in the streets, they would not storm republican parliaments or fire on the 
civilians protecting them.
Signs that Gorbachev had lost control
The west was provided with ample warnings that Gorbachev had lost control of the 
Soviet security forces, yet expressed almost universal surprise that the Kremlin leader 
was overthrown.
One early sign of Gorbachev's impotence was his repeated insistence that attacks by 
KGB, army, and the MVD's OMON special designation units in the Baltics and the 
Caucasus were beyond his control. These attacks lasted from January through July 
1991. In the end, they appeared timed to embarrass and discredit Gorbachev.
During Gorbachev's historic June visit to Sweden on the eve of his trip to Norway to 
deliver his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, army units moved threateningly 
around Lithuania while the USSR Procurator General issued an inflammatory report 
absolving the military from any wrongdoing during the bloody January crackdown there, 
blaming the civilian deaths on Lithuanian "militants."(12)
On June 27, just as Gorbachev was preparing to travel to London as a special guest at 
the Group of Seven summit, the OMON raided the Vilnius telephone exchange and 
claimed to have found a cache of weapons. For the first time, the Kremlin publicly 
criticized the OMON attacks.(13) A third major embarrassment for Gorbachev was 
staged during the Moscow summit with President Bush. Gunmen burst into a Lithuanian 
customs post on the Belorussian border, rounded up the eight officers inside, and shot 
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each of them execution-style in the back of the head: only one officer survived. Though 
Gorbachev pledged a full investigation, Lithuanian officials charged that the central 
authorities were not willing to cooperate.(14)
As if these demonstrations were not enough to humiliate Gorbachev, White House 
officials had the message personally delivered to them during the July summit. When 
Bush visited Kiev (where his remarks against national independence did little to 
reassure democrats or dissuade centralists), KGB personnel flown in from Moscow 
harassed, manhandled, and assaulted members of his entourage, including Press 
Secretary Marlin Fitzwater.(21) Yet the significance was lost on the administration.
Historic opportunity for parliament
Democratic forces in the Soviet Union now have an historic opportunity to consolidate 
their gains and begin dismantling the Soviet police state. Armed with a new sense of 
purpose, enhanced prestige, and the realization that people power really works, the 
union and the republican parliaments can exploit the humiliating political defeat of the 
KGB, MVD and military and take concrete steps to ensure that such abuses of power 
can never happen again.
They can begin by repealing the 1991 Law on State Security Organs and enacting real 
power of the purse and strict oversight laws, along with civil penalties for abuses of 
authority. With these actions, democratic forces can begin the lengthy process of 
irreversible reform.
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